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Summary findings
Chisari and Estache summarize the main lessons  involved employing workers from poor families in
emerging from Argentina's experience, including  infrastructure extension works.
universal service obligations in concession contracts.  * Beware of the latent opportunism of users who
They discuss free-riding risks, moral hazard problems,  benefit from special programs. Special treatment  of a
and other issues that arise when social concerns are  sector may encourage free-riding (for example,
delegated to private operators.  pensioners overused the telephone until a limnit  was
After reporting on Argentina's experience, Chisari and  placed on the number of subsidized phone calls they
Estache suggest some guidelines:  could make).
* Anticipate interjurisdictional externalities. Users'  *  Fixed allocations for payment of services do not
mobility makes targeting service obligations difficult.  ensure that universal service obligations will be met.
*  Minimize the risks imposed by elusive demand. In  How do vou deal with the problem that many pensioners
providing new services, a gradual policy may work better  do not pay their bills?
than a "shock."  Anticipate that operators will have more
e  Realize that unemployment leads to delincluency  information  than regulators do. If companies exaggerate
and lower expected tariffs. Elasticity of fixed and usage  supply costs in remote areas, direct interaction with poor
charges is important.  users there may lead to the selection of nmore  cost-
D  Deal with the fact that the poor have limited access  effective technologies.
to credit. Ultimately, plans that included credit lor the  *  "Tailored"  programs are often much more effective
payment of infrastructure charges were not that  than standardized programs. They are clearly more
successful.  expensive but, when demand-driven, are also more
C  Coordinate regulatory, employment, and social  effective.
policy. One successful plan to provide universal service
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1. Introduction
Even when a regulatory  framework responds to the most generalized  and solid practical and
theoretical recommendations,  it always requires some sort of adjustment  to the specificities  of each
economy, such as  its legal standards or  socio-economic characteristics.  In  particular, social
concerns should influence  tariff design, the specification  of the investment  plans, and the definition
of the social supply  obligations  for the operators. Generally speaking,  these social obligations  are at
the core of some of the emotional debates surrounding the privatization of infrastructure services.
They refer to the required supply of a bundle of  services under specific terms and conditions.
Examples  of social duties include:
*  services  to poor pensioners  or to the disabled,  by means of a differentiated  price from the rest of
the population  under equal service  conditions;
*  special  procedures  for regularizing  the non-performing  status of certain  users;
*  explicit  subsidies  to different  consumer  categories  based on their geographical  location  (rural
tariffs, widespread  markets),  the specificities  of their consumption  curve (for example,
electricity-intensive  users), or their income  level.
Besides  the expected  ethical  justifications  and more complex  concerns such as the concern for'
political stability and state cohesion, there are several reasons why society may be interested irL
promoting the extension of a service to a greater number of consumers.  These include fixed-cost
savings (natural monopoly), positive externalities (which are either difficult to  internalize or nor,
acknowledged  by consumers), and network operation  profits. This is why, while access by citizens
to basic telephony services is considered an entitlement that contributes to the normal and stable
development  of modern societies, the availability  of drinking water is placed within a category of
"merit goods", based on a positive externality  (the correlation to lower health expenses  for society).
The expenditure  for the services used by the disabled lies within the category of services rendered
for ethical reasons.
Section I analyzes  the conceptual aspects and financing options for obligatory service.  An
attempt is made to define and distinguish the concepts of Obligatory Service (OS) and Universal
Service Obligation  (USO).  Section II summarizes  Argentina's experience with Obligatory Service
and Universal  Service Obligation  for the Water and Sewage, Telephony, Gas and Electricity sectors.
It shows that this experience  has generally  been positive, although  there are some outstanding  issues
that are worth discussing.  Section III highlights the main lessons of Argentina's experience for
countries following  a similar infrastructure  privatization  strategy.
1. The Conceptual  Issues
1.1. Obligatory  Service  vs. Universal  Service  Obligation
The  concepts.  One  of  the  main  concerns that  policymakers have  in  the  context of
infrastructure privatization is to avoid a decline in the consumption  of services.  This risk stems
from either  insufficient supply or  insufficient demand.  Insufficient supply is  related to  the
concessionaires' lack of interest in supplying a market at the ongoing price.  Insufficient  demand
simply reflects cases where the private level of consumption  fails to reach a desirable level from a
social viewpoint.  While apparently somewhat  artificial, this taxonomy is useful when it comes to
defining regulatory tools.  For  instance, stimulating consumption (through tariff  subsidies to
customers) is inappropriate  in the first case since the failure does not come from the demand-sid-.
In the second case, compulsory service may not be efficient since it acts on the supply-side.  In
practice, regulators tackle scarce supply or  lack of demand by  imposing two conditions on the3
functioning of  the markets: the  Obligatory Service (OS) and the  Universal Service Obligation
(USO).  1
Obligatory  Service  occurs when a company  is asked  to allow access to its services to all users
who wish to join the supply system at the ongoing tariff or when a user is required to consume a
service.  To be  specific, there  are two types of obligatory service: the uni-directional service
(obligation  to serve), in which the supply-side  is warned not to introduce rationing mechanisms  on
the demand-side  (or not to discriminate through  prices); and the bi-directional  service, in which the
demand-side cannot  self-exclude from  consumption (it  has  an  obligation to  accept service).
Telephone, gas and electricity services are included in the first classification. Water and sanitation
are included in the second group for health and environmental  protection reasons.  However, in
many cases, obligatory  connection  is also related  to financing  the extension  of the network. 2
Universal Service Obligation 3 encompasses  the idea of giving all community members the
possibility  of gaining access to product consumption  by paying a sufficiently  low or affordable  tariff.
While the production capacity is endogenous  but adjusts to the ongoing tariffs (demand must be
faced at  these tariffs) under  Obligatory Service, USO  focuses on  giving all  members of  the
community the possibility of reaching an "acceptable"  consumption level at a generally low tariff
since consumption  would be unreachable  without investment  plans that are compatible  with growing
demand.
The implementation for  regulatory purposes.  The distinction between OS and USO is useful
because it implies very different rules of the game for the operators responsible  for implementation.
In addition, the usefulness  of imposing  USO (the stronger form of obligation)  varies across sectors
because it depends on the social valuation  of the product or services and whether or not there are
any substitutes. Many services  may be highly valuable from a private viewpoint  but not necessarily
from a social viewpoint. This highlights  one of the dilemmas  of regulation. The use of the service
should encourage  consumption and access and at the same time, the regulator must restrain free-
riding and misuse.
Table 1: USO vs. OS
Obligatory  Service  arises:
*When  there are location  differences  that increase  supply  costs  for some consumers.
*When  some consumers  present  "accessibility"  problems,  particularly  those with  physical  or motor  disabilities.
*When  the degree  of availability  of certain privately  supplied  services  is lower than the socially  desired  level (public  telephones,
special  numbers,  among  others).
Universal  Service  or Universality  arises:
*When  the product  is essential
*When  there are groups  of consumers  that cannot  gain access  to a product  or service  at current tariffs.
*When  the lack  of supply  or impossibility  of gaining  access  limits  consumers  in other  markets  or activities  (for instance,  in the labor
market)
*When  the impossibility  of gaining  access  also entails  the exclusion  of the consumers  from technological  progress  and the evolution
of modern  societies  (typical  case in the field of communications).
On the other hand, the regulator must also sometimes ensure that self-exclusion from a
service (on the demand side) is not the main source of divergence between social and private
interests or is not a source of conflict between suppliers and users.  Self-exclusion  from sanitation
services has an impact on the economy's productivity and on hospital costs.  Self-exclusion  from
telephone  services  lessens the value of the network. It is even valuable  for the agents to use services
'Part of the intemational  experience  is summarized  in ITU (1994),  Wellenius,  et. al (1994)  and OECD  (1995).
2 This  is  clear  when  the  obligation  of connection  applies  even  in  cases  where  there  is  no  dwelling,  for  example,  on  empty  land  lots
OFTEL  (1995)  (1997);  Analysys  (1995);  Muller  (1997);  Graham,  (1995)4
which are normally not included in the universality objective; for example, a fax machine.  Self-
exclusion  from the electricity  network, and, to a lesser extent, from the gas network, reduces service
quality in terms of safety and stability.
In this context, an obligatory service imposed on the suppliers-extending the network to
poor neighborhoods  away from high-density, high-income  centers-may  be inefficient  because the
consumers  are not willing  to use the service (lack of demand due to low income). 4 However, at the
social level, allowing  the poor to continue  using substitutes  may not be a good idea either.  Indeed,
the substitute may be either more or less costly than the network service (in water supply and
sewage, for instance, the alternative is to buy bottled water which is often more expensive, or to
rely on  sources that contribute to  the spreading of diseases), or  the  self-exclusion  of potential
customers  may reduce  the financing  of the network itself.
The obligatory  service may then best become  a universal service by accepting  a specific  tariff
reduction for some or all users.  Openly admitting  the possibility of reducing tariffs for some users
paves the way for free-riding, even in  cases of  certain clearly identifiable users  (such as  the
pensioners).  Bringing down tariffs, particularly access tariffs, endangers the sustainability  of the
suppliers or instills  the need to exert pressure on public finances in order to somehow  subsidize  the
service.
The risk of self-exclusion  and hence the attractiveness  of universal service obligations are
particularly important when situations of lasting high unemployment  levels create the problem of
how to deal with the unemployed  within the general definition  of Universal Service and Obligatory
Service. This argument  is relevant in the case of Argentina, where the economy  went through and is
still facing high levels of unemployment  that are unusual compared  to the mean for the seventies  and
eighties. While the normal rate stood at around 6%, by 1993, unemployment  had reached  9.3% and
went up to around 18% after the "Tequila"  effect (end of 1994 and beginning  of 1995).
Tables  2 and 3 show the results of "naive"  estimates  of "tariff-pressure."  Average  tariffs were
considered  by decile. Notice  the high level of unemployment  for the poorest deciles  and the significant
proportion  of total income  when all services  are provided simultaneously  (thought  financed). Financial
commitments  are not seen to be too significant when infrastructure  payments and the connection
charge  are left aside (they amount  to less than 7% of total income of a family  belonging  to the poorest
decile). Overall,  this reinforces  the case for the explicit inclusion  of USO in the privatization  process,
decided  as part of an overall structural  adjustment  of an economy.  5
Table 2: The cost of water and sanitation for the four poorest income classes in January 1998
Decile  Household total  Fixed and Variable  Fixed Charges  Total Expenses  Total Expenses as a % of
income (US$)  Charges (US$)  (US$)  (US$)  Total Income
1  298.06  48.41  57.33  105.74  35.48%
2  464.11  56.88  57.33  114.21  24.61%
3  491.33  58.51  57.33  115.85  23.58%
4  669.95  62.66  57.33  119.99  17.91%
N.B.:  Authors'  calculations
4 The legal demands to join the network  (for example, if it runs in front of the door of a dwelling), or the social demands to  do so (because others hEve
done so and there are no longer any substitutes) may favor a progressive process of "dualization" where the poor "flee" from efficient services.
5 The need to better define the tariff structure under unemployment is discussed in academic circles (seeMarchand et.al. (1989) and Bos (1994)), but is
also recognized by practitioners.  Some of the gas distributors have envisaged mechanisms to facilitate  access to credit for users who cannot afford  he
entire infrastructure charge.  To be eligible, the user must have a statement of earnings in order to be granted a loan.5
Table 3: Estimate  of user's expenses  in electricity, gas and phone services  in January 1998
Income  Income  Household  Households'  Rate of  Monthly  Monthly  Total  Total
Decile  per  Average  total Income  Unemployment  Fixed  Variable  Expenses as
capita  per Person  (US$)  (%)  charges  Charges  % of Total
(US$)  (US$)  (US$)  Income
1  56.8  5.25  298.06  40.7  29.04  19.37  48.41  16.2%
2  107.7  4.31  464.11  28.8  29.04  27.85  56.88  12.3%
3  148.4  3.31  491.33  21.3  29.04  29.48  58.51  11.9%
4  186.1  3.6  669.95  22.6  29.16  33.50  62.66  9.4%
5  233.6  3.28  766.25  16.6  30.58  34.48  65.06  8.5%
6  296.0  2.94  870.32  15.4  32.52  34.81  67.33  7.7%
7  372.0  3.07  1142.16  12.2  34.80  39.98  74.78  6.5%
8  486.0  2.78  1351.06  8.3  37.06  40.53  77.59  5.7%
9  684.5  2.69  1841.27  6.2  42.04  46.03  88.07  4.8%
10  1 383.7  2.25  3113.37  6.1  49.76  62.27  112.03  3.6%
N.B.: Authors'  calculations  based on data provided  by Gasparini  (1999).  As of January 1998,  monthly  fixed charges are as follows:  electricity:  $2.32;
gas: $6.95;  phone: $16.45;  water and sanitation  varies per decile from $0.73 to $24.05.
1.2. Financing  USO.
Universal service obligation  entails providing the service at a lower price than the company
would be willing to  charge if  it were a monopoly, or  even if  it developed its activities in  a
competitive  market.  USO determines  that consumers  whose supply is more costly than the average
pay the same price as the rest.  The regulated price will necessarily be below those costs for this
group of users.  Something  similar happens, although for different reasons, with the lower-income
sectors.  In this case, the price could be above their payment capacity, independent  of the market
structure in which  the company  or companies  operate.
In both cases, USO entails facing costs. 6 How can the supply of services to these consumers
be financed at regulated prices?  In principle, there are four financing systems for the Universal
Service Obligation:
*  Direct transfers either to consumers  or through  company  disbursements,
*  Establishment  of a fund,
*  Cross-subsidies  among  consumers  and/or among  products, and
*  Adjustability  of the duration of the concession.
a) Direct transfers.
In terms of economic  efficiency,  direct transfers to consumers  are the best option because the
relative prices of the economy are not altered.  Each one pays the pertinent price. However, this
system has two inconveniences  that make it impractical.  First, it is difficult  for the regulator  to know
the exact payment capacity of each agent or the real production cost of the  company for each
6  If the prices move away from the opportunity  costs of the resources  used in production  - marginal  costs - a social cost also appears  that may not be
internalized  by the company  but will be paid by society as a whole.  See Bums (1995) for an introduction  to these issues in the framework  of
discriminatory  prices.6
location, so it is therefore difficult to make an efficient transfer calculation. This is an "adverse
selection"  problem. The regulator must also ensure that those who receive a transfer spend it on the
service for which it was conceived, which is a moral hazard problem. The second inconvenience
refers to implementation,  since transfers to the consumer  entail that he/she must pay the real supply
price.  By definition, this price is  different than that paid by  other consumers.  These price
differences  affect  public opinion, which  does not accept any discrimination,  making  it difficult  to put
into practice, even  by using a compensation  system.
Two changes have been proposed to solve this issue: transfers should be received by the
company and consumers should not be discriminated  by prices.  Although this system solves the
moral hazard problems since consumers  do not receive any extra income that can be used for other
purposes, it does not eliminate  adverse selection because the problem of identifying  the people who
really need these transfers still remains.  Nevertheless, this method has been used in different
regulated sectors in  Argentina (electricity, gas and water) for pensioners and consumers in the
Patagonia  region.
Of  course, financing must then come from the  collection of  global public resources.
Therefore, other publicly supplied products and  services must be  sacrificed and  either taxes
(distortive  ones) or the financial  exposure (indebtedness)  of the public sector must be increased. In
fact, the Argentine  public sector started to accumulate  a heavy debt burden with operators through
the social security  system.
b) Financing Fund.
This system is, in fact, a way of financing  transfers such as those discussed  above. The fund
consists of a contribution  from the different market operators toward those who have the universal
service obligation.  It is a mechanism applicable  to situations where entrance into the industry is
consented to, but USO is only compulsory  for one operator. Different options have been proposed
for collecting  fund resources, although  the main source is to levy taxes on sales registered by those
entering the service.  The other options include charges for granting licenses, a process which may
be competitive  and is known as auctioning, and inter-connection  charges if the operator responsible
for USO is the owner of a network that all others must use.  In the same way that direct transfers to
consumers are  not applicable-specifically, the paucity of  information handled by  the operators
regarding the specific characteristics of each agent-the  last two systems mentioned have other
deficiencies  that may affect the functioning  of the market. The acceptance  of cross-subsidies  among
consumers or among services may affect the dynamics of the competition  process by encouraging
less efficient operators in more profitable segments  (cream skimming). Likewise, imposing  a fund
with inadequate  collection  mechanisms  may also affect the competition  process since it may impose
payment conditions  that hinder long-term  incentives.
c) Cross-subsidies.
The use of cross-subsidies  is a result of the regulator's incapability  to fix different tariffs
according to production costs (Varian, 1989).  The justifications for this decision generally follow
three main categories. The first is associated  with the equality  that the regulator seeks to impose on
prices and supply of the service in general.  The second reason is linked to how information is
distributed  between the regulator and the regulated company.  If the latter argues that the supply
costs are different for one group or another, information  regarding the real supply costs and a
method to correctly fix prices may be out of the regulator's reach. If estimates  of these costs are not
exact, it may be preferable, as far as regulation is concerned, to fix a single price.  One of the
current problems  in fixing telephone  tariffs for rural areas in Argentina is defining exactly where the
urban service ends and the rural service starts (the latter being more expensive). The third reason is
related to specific  social objectives.  The phenomenon  of localization  occurs when higher prices in
rural areas discourage  the settlement  of people in these districts, thus affecting  society in ways that it7
is probably unwilling to ignore (defense and national security issues, among others). 7 This last
reason admits, at least theoretically, alternative  solutions, since direct transfers may be generated  to
those who settle in the most unfavorable  or far away  urban centers, without affecting  relative prices.
It is possible for a company's activity to be subsidized  in areas where it is not profitable, but this
would only be efficient if the exact amount of the subsidy could be calculated  without affecting  the
company's incentive  to recover losses.  This scenario assumes a good level of regulator knowledge
regarding production costs, which gives us an idea of how important the distribution  of informnation
between the regulator and the regulated  company  is.
Whatever their justification, cross-subsidies  entail costs.  The main ones refer to efficiency
since relative prices move away from relative costs (marginal costs).  In order to minimize these
costs, the regulator must decide how to define these subsidies, either among consumers  or among
services.  However, this last possibility is not open to  all industries, or at least not to the same
extent.  For example, in telecommunications,  the subsidy may be defined in both directions since
this sector offers a range of products  that may be affected  by such a policy.  If difficulty  of access is
the USO objective, for instance, the fixed charge may be brought down by adding a surcharge for
use.  Another example is basic telephony, which could be cheaper if financed with contributions
from other services that are not considered to be basic.  Normally, the latter possibility does not
appear in an industry lacking a many-sided  supply.  Therefore, in water, the cross-subsidy  could be
implemented  among consumers, or at the most, between the connection and consumption  charges.
Since this  service is  indispensable, it  would be difficult to  finance the  cross-subsidy through
consumption  in favor of access.
d) Extension  of the concession  and coverage.
Lastly, the regulatory experience shows that there are other possibilities. Although  they are
not strictly financing sources, they do provide the means for alternative funding. The first is the
extension of the concession  through which the company enhances its monopoly  on the basis of the
exclusivity  granted for its operation in the market. This mechanism  allows the company  use its own
resources to  continue financing the essential investments  needed to comply with the USO.  This
mechanism was proposed in Argentina in  order to  cover the collection deficit in  infrastructure
charges, which occurred  when the extension  works reached  poorer neighborhoods  farther and farther
away from densely populated districts. Another example is  coverage extension.  Through this
policy, the regulator grants additional financing sources in compensation  for the universal service
obligation.  If the company is obliged to provide services to non-profitable  community  sectors, the
regulator offers to extend coverage to include consumers  to which cross-subsidies  may be charged.
However, this is  a  case of  cross-subsidies between different generations. In  other words,  the
extension of the area is the mechanism through which the population base for the collection of
subsidies  that finance the universal service obligation is expanded.  If the extension is not feasible
because of geographic  limitations,  there is an alternative  that entails the "reserving" of certain parts
of the market for the operator in charge of providing USO.  This policy, however, is difficult to
implement  because the consumers  located  in the reserved area would  not benefit from competition.
1.3. Universal  service in multi-product  industries.
In many industries, providing  a spectrum  of services is a serious  practical problem which can
only be addressed through a  very clear definition of  the  exact scope of  the universal service
criterion. For example, oral transmission,  emergency  calls, telephone  directories  and telephones  for
the disabled could be considered a basket of products provided within the definition of universal
service. But why stop there and leave aside other special services (fax, Internet, point-to-point
' It must be recalled  that this debate already took place when  the issue of telephone  tariffs was discussed, regarding  the possible differences  between
consumers living in the interior and those in the more densely populated Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area (See: Instituto de Economia UADE,  1996).8
communications,  among  many others)?  In practice,  because the supply of these is subject  to different
market rules or regulations. But this is not the only possible distinction  that can be made. Another
common  way is to distinguish  between access and use. This means that there are two different  types
of demand, each with possibly very different sensitivity to prices and income.  Access demand
normally has less elasticity  than use demand, according  to some studies (NERA, 1994) and each will
have different  economic  effects when the universal service obligation  is applied.
From a regulator's viewpoint, it important to understand that the USO is essentially  an ad
hoc mechanism  that acts on prices, driving them away from strictly allocative efficiency, with an
economic  impact  that may be divided into two parts: distributive (among  consumers)  and allocative,
with both affecting  each their respective  markets. In principle, there are few allocative  inefficiencies
in those markets where demand is less elastic. 8 In this context, a few questions emerge. Should the
universal  service obligation  be applied to access (provision  of the network), to its use by consumers,
or to both?  Which has a lower social cost in regard to USO implementation? These questions are
essential to determnining  the economic imnpact  that USO would have, as well as possible financing
methods. 9
To continue  the telecom example, if a price that is lower than the competitive  market price is
sought, the efficiency of the market will be affected because it is assumed  that in the long run, the
production level will be provided at  socially optimum costs.  In  addition to  the  competition
potentiality of the service's operation, the use demand elasticity tends to be greater than that of
access; therefore, efficiency costs could be significant if prices move away from the long-term
marginal costs.  Regarding access, it moves slightly away from the fully competitive  market, an
issue which has long been discussed since the companies that provide it have a certain market
power.  This analysis suggests that imposing the universal service obligation would have fewer
distortive effects if it was enforced  on connection  and not on use charges.'  In this way, USO would
permit access to  the connection network by  the greatest possible amount of consumers without
imposing ad hoc effective consumption  or use, which would be the case should the prices of the
pulse per timLe  unit be reduced (three-part  tariff).  It is worth mentioning  that the recent tariff reformn
implemented in  Argentina has in  some ways moved in  this  direction since free pulses were
eliminated  and fixed charges were reduced for those groups  of low-income  consumers.
1.4. Regulation  of the obligatory  service and alternative  technologies.
When there are supply alternatives, the likelihood of successfully facing the problem of
scarce supply mentioned  in the example above increases  considerably  because such technologies  are
bound to  generate different cost structures.  This may be observed in  the telecommunications
industry in view of the constant technological  changes.  An example is wireless telephony, which
applies  a technology  increasingly  used in rural areas or low-density  districts that are not attractive  to
companies  operating with fixed networks.  The lack of attraction from an economic  viewpoint is
undoubtedly  due to the fact that the minimum infrastructure requirements (networks) necessary to
meet the demands  of the inhabitants  of the area represent a cost burden that cannot be financed  with
what is collected  from those consumers.
The advantage of wireless technologies consists of saving those costs, at least to a sufficiently
important  extent, so there is no economic  income barrier.  However, some of these technologies  are
normally more inefficient for areas with a higher population density, due to the congestion and
interference  inherent to urban districts.  These technologies  normally  have lower costs than those of
This  idea is the basis of the price structure  known  as "Ramsey  pricing".  Berg,  et. al (1988);  Brown,  et al. (1986);  Mitchell,  et. al (1991).
The debate on whether  it will be financed  by cross-subsidies  (should  access or use charges  be subsidized?)  or by direct transfers  to the beneficiaries
(dealt with  in a later  section)  is still pending.
10 This is still evident in conditions  where variable  costs represent a lower share of total costs in relation to fixed costs. The network  industries  are
generally  included  within  this definition. Therefore,  the "affordability"  problem  is closely  related  to connection  charges.9
the fixed network telephony at low production levels (few consumers), but these costs grow rapidly
if the population  served in an area increases.  In this way, the regulator may choose to permit the
entry  of  companies with more  efficient technologies for these particular areas.  Under these
circumstances, competition is possible, since the capital tends to be divisible, thus reducing the
minimum scale.  Therefore, the  regulator has the  possibility of  introducing competition and
demanding  supply of the service.  Likewise, the company  that is already installed may be forced to
adopt  this  technology  through  an  additional  clause  to  the  universal  service  obligation
(OFTEL,  1997).
Finally, the possibility of competition  presents an interesting  perspective  from the regulatory
viewpoint since it diminishes the pressure on the regulator to  fix prices.  It  is expected that a
continuous competitive  process will lead to a price reduction in services.  However, the entry of
new suppliers  may lead to duplicating  costs which are amortized  once the company invests  capital in
the area under consideration. If such capital is "specific" for that activity, and exits in the market
when conditions  justify (this is also part of the competitive  process), that capital cannot be freely
reassigned.  It subsequently  stands idle, or is underutilized, and society faces costs that must be
calculated  from the regulator's point of view. (11  and 12)
If the regulator has no alternative  regarding supply and service is obligatory, the debate boils
down to finding a mechanism to finance the activity when conditions do not allow self-financing.
The regulatory  experience shows that pricing with cross-subsidies  is the most utilized tool.  1 3 These
types of prices appear when there are differences in costs that cannot be reflected (at least not
totally) in the tariffs or, alternatively, when there are differences in the purchasing capacity of the
consumers.
2. Argentina's experience with Service Obligations
This section  summarizes  how Obligatory Service  and Universal Service Obligation  have been
dealt with  in  the  fields  of  Telephony, Electricity, Gas,  Water  and  Sanitation in  Argentina.
However, it is worth clarifying  that the debate focuses on the segments  of these industries  that are
regulated at the national level.  The emphasis is threefold: a discussion of the responsibility for
expanding  the networks, the financing of these processes, and the elements that determine both the
normal tariff and the expected  tariff, including  the treatment of consumers with arrears. There are a
few obligations  treated similarly across sectors, but they are the exception  rather than the rule. For
instance, the preferential treatment given to pensioners is similar in the gas, electricity, water and
sanitation  sectors,  but differs somewhat  in telephony.
Decree  319/97 determined the  conversion of  the  tariff  subsidies granted  in  favor of
pensioners for gas, electricity, water and sanitation services (stipulated in resolution 532/88).  A
direct payment of $13.50 went to each beneficiary (those collecting the minimum  pension of $150).
With this money, the pensioners  must pay the companies  the pertinent household  tariffs.  Within the
new subsidizing  mechanism  for those collecting  the minimum  pension, some pensioners  who receive
a fixed amount do not pay their bills.  In other words, they use the money  they receive directly from
the  social security for  other purposes, running the  risk  of  service cut-offs.  Therefore, the
mechanism of paying the companies directly was substituted for a method that allowed for the
deviation of subsidies  toward unwanted aims. Similarly, there are no differential tariffs or special
" The importance  of capital  specificity  in decision-making  for entering  and exiting  the market  is highlighted  in Klein, et. al (1978).
12 The impact  of technological  change in defining  the universal  service  obligation  is highlighted  in ITU (1994). The 1997  US Telecommunications  Act
accepts  that the definition  of USO  is dominated  by technological  changes  and recommends  imposing  a "dynamic"  definition.
13 There  is still a problem  regarding  the definition  of cross-subsidy,  an issue  which  will be dealt with again in the section  on financing.10
treatment  for the unemployed  users in any of the analyzed sectors (gas, electricity, telephony,  water
and sanitation).
2.1.  Telephony
The National Telecommunications  Act (Law No. 19.798) was a first approach  to obligatory
service.  It determined that "everyone has the right to use telecommunications  services open to
public correspondence  in  accordance with the pertinent rules and regulations."  No reference,
however, was made to pricing. On the other hand, the Tender Specifications  set forth the obligatory
nature of the activity  by "ensuring  continuity, regularity, equality and generality in the provision of
the public services  under the responsibility  of the company". Equality implicitly  forbids any sort of
price discrimination  among consumers  beyond those allowed by the tariff structures, in particular,
tariffs for households, companies  and professionals. Generality  sets the target of disseminating  the
benefits of basic and non-basic  telephony  to all consumers  who wish to have the service.
Universality  is explicitly stated in several  passages of the sector's regulatory  legislation."4  An
example is the "Agreement signed between the two Licensed companies  and the State (through the
Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services) for tariff reduction" (Decree 506/92).  It
states that there is a need to bring down connection  charges in order to attract potential  consumers,
reinforcing the idea of universalizing  the use of telephony, or at least Basic Telephony.  Resolution
25.839/96 of the Communications  Secretariat  understood  universality  as "the universal  promotion  of
basic telephony at fair and reasonable prices." The recently issued Decree 92/97 ("General Basic
Telephony Tariff Structure.  Amendments.  Regulations")  stipulates this regulatory line of action.,
thus confirming  the enforcement  of the above principle, and sets forth the commitment  to elaborate  a
National  Social  Telephony  Plan' 5 (Section  6) to materialize  the above-mentioned  concept.
Finally, since the universality  criterion  is, in essence, a principle that aims at encouraging  the
entry of new consumers,  it makes sense to believe  that the connection  charges,  as well as the so-called
fixed charges,  which  are part of the final tariff paid by the consumer,  are important.' 6
Connection  charges
The connection charge may be compared to a charge paid by the consumer and should be
considered as such.  Therefore, the fixing of this charge normally has important  consequences  on the
issue of exclusion  (a point considered  in detail in Decrees 506/92 and 92/97). The companies  agreed
to lower connection  charges when they took over because they were not in line with international
levels.  There has been a greater connection  charge reduction in the non-household  segment  because
there was a greater intensity  of use of the telephone  service in this sector (greater indispensability).
It was also deemed convenient  not to affect the production costs of these sectors with surcharges.'7
Moreover, these sectors demand services other than those that are considered  basic.
Regulations  in force until 1996 acknowledged  three groups (the household or family group,
the commercial,  and the professional),  but Decree 92/97 includes the government  as a new category.
This categorization  is reflected in the fixed charge of the final tariff.  Decree 92/97 authorized an
increase in the fixed charges for all categories, which in the case of households  meant an increase
from $8.86 to $12.49 per month. The magnitude  of this fixed charge was justified by the fact that
14 The criteria for defining public services include these four characteristics, cf  Mayral.
15 This plan should have been drafted within 30 days after Decree 92/91 became operational.
16 The latter is analyzed in the following section together with the distributive aspects of said tariffs.
7  Although,  in the first instance,  restructuring  had acted contrary to the  Ramsey rule, in  fact, it is not  possible to  make  a concrete analysis without
resorting to a balanced evaluation mechanism.  It is necessary to take  into account the demand for telephone  services versus demand elasticity regarding
the rest of the products and the share of telephone services in total costs.11
the  companies  would  show  cost  structures  with  a  high  share  of  fixed  costs  related  to  network
maintenance and not the measured rate.
From the distributive standpoint, the impact is remarkable because high fixed charges somehow
favor those categories that use the telephone service more intensely, since users in this category can
"liquefy" the fixed charge with a decreasing mean tariff, as measured by the mean cost of each call.
The problem with the fixed charge, therefore, is that it seems to impact more on the household segment
than on other segments, since this category has a lower average consumption.  Moreover, within the
household segment, fixed charges more seriously affect the lower income groups.
Tariff structure
Historically,  the fixed charge was in line with the density of clients in each area.  This was
established  in  Decree  2332/90  (Annex XVI.I)  on  property  transfer.  This  criterion  was justified
because  the  maintenance  costs  of  the  exchanges  were  inversely  proportional  to  the  customers
included  in  each exchange,  thus confirming  the  idea that  the fixed costs  in  this  activity are very
important.  Despite the rationality  of this measure,  such a decree followed the sector's  tradition of
reversing this reasoning and charging higher fixed charges in locations where the telephone network
was denser.  In this way, the expansion of the network was financed when the service was state-run
(profits obtained from the network  'justified"  that current customers pay for the connection of future
clients).
The recent  tariff rebalancing t8 (still strongly debated)  reversed this  criterion  and eliminated
district  differences by  establishing  a  single fixed charge for  the whole  country.  But the  level of
fixed  charges  discriminates  among  consumers  in  the  same  category.  Therefore,  within  the
household  category  (Resolution  348/88,  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Public  Works  and  Services,
Resolution  127/91,  National  Telecommunications  Commission)  discounts  of  up  to  25%  were
considered for pensioners collecting a minimum pension, plus a similar increase in free pulses.  The
goal is to  avoid a considerable  number of consumers  abandoning the market by  returning  already
installed  lines.  This  reduction  led  to  different  modifications.  Decree  92/97  created  the  "Low
Consumption  Customer"  within  the  household  or  family  category,  with  a  view  to  achieving
universality.  Although  to  date  there  are  no  clear  cost  studies,  according  to  estimates  by  the
Communications Secretariat and private organizations, there is a suspicion that the tariff structure in
force until  January  1997 assigned  values to  inter-urban calls that were  not in  line with production
costs.  On the other hand,  inter-urban communications represented  8% of the total number of calls,
but accounted for 73% of TELECOM's  income (during 1994-95).
This  situation  was  not  only  indicative  of  a  problem  related  to  economic  and  allocative
efficiency in service  supply, but  also highlighted an important distributive  problem.  The diagnosis
study  carried  out  by  the  Communications  Secretariat  noted  that  customers  from  the  interior
contributed more to the income of the companies than was expected, taking into account the different
consumption  structures for  customers  from  the so-called Metropolitan  Area.  This diagnosis  study
was apparently based on  the fact that  inter-urban  tariffs amply  surpassed production  costs,  while
urban  tariffs were undervalued.  The correction consisted of a remarkable  reduction in  inter-urban
tariffs and an increase in urban  tariffs (those of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area  -BAMA).  It
must be noted that this measure is,  to a certain extent, the opposite of what was decided regarding
the fixed charges,  through which BAMA made a greater  contribution toward  financing the service
than the interior of the country, due to regional cost differences.
"
8The re-balancing was an attempt to correct relative tariffs, keeping the companies' total  income at a constant level.  It did not deal with costs, nor did it
guarantee sustainability.  It did, however, acknowledge  that the current tariff structure allowed for cream-skimming.  It was based on priceifixed charge
demand elasticities in urban and inter-urban areas.This is a long-standing problem regarding the regulation of  the Se9-ui. t n,  -i
before privatization occurred.  It is worth stressing that in 1980, it was estirn  atd  dIatl
which represented  4% of the total,  generated  20% of ENTEL's  income.  The argurncrr-  set W3-.h  Lbqz  4%-
regulatory  agency insisting on tariff rebalancing was that urban traffic accourAtd fr  92  ./'
and that these were being charged at 30% below the marginal cost,  thus  result1- rig  i il  a driiilf  tl.a:i'  a, tt,
be offset with inter-urban calls.  The implementation of changes  brought the pr-  of  t 1i,
to  international  standards and aimed to affect regional  redistribution (such  as  ..  -1.
treatment  of Key  1 in the interior) and  social issues (benefits for reducedcorsrnyh  :
Decree 92/97 explicitiy states two principles, which undoubtedly have distributive ef,fs:  __  ell 
in the treatment  of consumers  from different geographical areas; and  2) encouraging cmt:.  sc-a,
sectors  to enter the market,  although an efficiency price may niot be assigned to tlhern (loPed  n. a.1ua
production costs).
Expansion  of Consumer  Range
Social telephony also reflects the decision to enhanice  the consumer  range.  i  e  :VJ5
that  this  restructuring  produced  cross-effects  among  the  different  consu-  er seiluer:s  41Li;  Ia"-
difficult  to  measure  since  there  are  no  official publications  on  production  coJsts.  Howr  ;e
information  gathered permits a  superficial evaluation of the measures  adopted,  begirnig  winq V
average  bills ex-ante and ex-post,  as calculated  by the National Comrunications Selemtariat.  Al  h s
metlhodology has  a clear  disadvantage because  it does  not  enablee  the  diffieentiadion  be_Le  t-
origin aind the destination of the cross-payments that stem froma  the tariff structure, aiioU-Ss
allow an estimate of the global impact on consumer categories.
The  first  evaluation  made  by  the  Comimunications Secretariat  showi/s  that the  -;.  L  sf
consumers  classified  as  households  would  suffer  an  increase  in  their  average  !bills,  -,x_  a:e  'C'#ne
remaining categories would record  a reduction.  Average bills for these consurnet  gro-!ugs  -eordo
increases of approximately 21% for the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area and  15% -for the oue￿mc.
The former is the group of consumers that are the most affected by the proposed tariaiff  rebai
The impact of this structure on the affected categories seems to be very imnpo-ant.onsebcYe  K
average bills below those of the remaining consumers.  On the other hand,  the govt  (>
commercial sectors, which benefit most from the change,  spend tlhe most,  not only because a- llit:f
activity,  but  also because  of  their  consumption  structure,  which  is  more  linked to  teffc;
which tariffs have dropped (inter-urban  and international).  The reasons  seem to be relate'  .;o
the  relative  price  of  the  fixed  charges  (more  bills  for  lower  amounts)  and  the  ioient-  r  -f
consumnption  in  inter-urban  and  international  calls.  Both  effects  somehow favor  the eoGi'rrnen+I-ioi,
professional  and government  categories over the household  sector.  Supply costs for baseti
are not the same in densely  populated areas as it is in those where the  populat"ion  is more  ,5'  c_as
Consumers  in less populated  areas  are not less  "wealthy" thana  others,  but  tfhe  costs or of  i  iv
them with access to  the network  within the framework  of the available technology are  veaLir-
Therefore,  natural monopolies are also at stake.  In fact, tariff rebalancing was an attenmp.  a;  noer
the progressive use of mechanisms such as the "call-back".
The problemrs of obligatory  service regarding basic telephony  services are  Cxoci  r  .
the provision  of access to  potential users  located in places that are  either  f-a-r  aiwavy  od cJ'-A  ft-0-l;>  >
reach. Taking into account  externalities,  the system as a whole  is interested  -in  -he  p,hC  2  sa a
minimu-m  level  of  services.  This  sets  fortb  several  alternatives,  includinig the  use  o  l
network  or  of  some  alternative  means  of  communication.  Recently,  licenses were gianaL-t;1  -U.,
operating  low-orbit satellites that would provide  services at a  high price,  which,  noethebless  .-r
still be afforded (US $3 per minute).
One  of  the mail  problems  currently  facing regulators  is  defining  the  iiiniti  ise'
-telephony and the remaining  telephony  services.  There  is the problem  of  ui-nar-io-  n as'»  -13
between operators and  regulators and that  of  potential opportunism since the companies may
exaggerate costs for permitting access.  Introducing substitution technologies, or at least making
them available  and potentially  competitive,  seems to be an appropriate  solution.
Treatment  of Delinquency
The treatment given to delinquent  customers  and the pertinent charges for disconnection  and
reconnection  may determine a relatively higher 'expected' tariff for the users who have uncertain
jobs and fluctuatinig  wages.  When a bill is not paid by the customer within 30 days after its due
date,  suppliers may suspend the  service.  According to  a  recent amendment to  the  Customer
Regulations, this suspension for a  prudent period affects "outgoing calls"  exclusively and the
licensee shall allow the  client to  continue receiving calls and to  communicate with emergency
services. In this way, they do not lose network gains, and society  remains unpunished  for an unpaid
expense by the user.  Once the service has been suspended, if the owed amount is not settled 60
days after the due date, the service is definitively  cut off and the customer must pay the debt plus the
reconnection charge in order to reestablish  the service.  This has led to attempts by users to elude
charges for arrears  or avoid payment for very high bills.  They take advantage of the many extra
lines and the low  installation charges.  Therefore,  some users prefer  to  give up  their  line,  avoid
payment, and then ask for a new line under the name of another person (a relative,  for example).
Preferential treatment for pensioners and low-income customers
The tariff structure prior  to Decree 92/97 considered special discounts to benefit pensioners,
but it did not take into account  their monthly consumption. As was noted earlier, many pensioners
had a  montlhily  average  consumption rate  above that  of household  and  communercial  customers.  A
ceiling was set on the amount of pulses, and increasing bloc tariffs were introduced,  which benefited
pensioners  who used  up  to  300  monthly  telephone pulses  and  those  households  with  a  monthly
consumption of up to  150 telephone pulses.  These "low consumption customers"  within a household
or family category respond to a USO criterion.
Social Public Telephony Plan
According to Resolutions 2130/97 and  1716/97, the National Government must implement a
"Social Public Telephony Plan  at the national level,  targeted at areas with high population density
and  scarce  economic  resources."  The  objective  is  to  promote  the  maximum  utilization  and
expansion of the telephone network,  adjusting tariffs in  such a way so as to  facilitate the access of
low-income custoners.
In the 1997-98 period, both Telefonica de Argentina S.A.  and Telecom S.A.  were forced to
install  1000 semi-public phones for receiving calls.  The installation of these phones will not entail
any connection charges or fixed monthly charges.  They will be located in charities, municipalities,
intermediate  associations,  schools,  and  first  aid  centers,  but  not  in  the  streets,  despite  the
Communications  Secretariat  being informed  that the destruction  of phones does not normally  occur.
One of *he most  common complaints is that the semi-public and public phones do not give
any small change; which means an implicit minimum tariff for poor users.  The companies  allege
that it is impossible to  transform telephones into change-giving  machines (there is thus a moral
issue).  These public and semi-public phones will operate on legal tender valued at $ 0.05,  $0.10,
$0.25 and $0.50.  The pulse is priced at five cents (VAT included) without any distinction between
normal, peak or  reduced tariff timetables.  Although inter-urban calls may  also be made at14
differential tariffs, the phones will be installed with a blocking mechanisms for incoming and
outgoing  international  calls.
2.2.  Electricity Services
Law 15.336/60 already stated certain obligations for the service licensee, such as service
quality clauses, for instance. Law 24.065/92, which characterized  electricity  distribution as a public
utility, stated that "distributors  should  meet all electricity service demands  required from them," and
moreover, that "they must allow indiscriminate  access to third parties to transmission  capacity," and
may not "grant or offer advantages  or give preferential treatment for access to their installations."
The concession contracts of the Edenor, Edesur and Edelap distributors forces them to meet all
supply demands for this  public service within their  concession area,  and  to  see to  all  new
requirements, whether it is an increase  in supply capacity or a new request for services.  Likewise,
the  contracts say  that  the  distributors must make  all  necessary investments to  fulfill their
commitments  regarding the provision of this public service.  However, users have to fulfill certain
requisites for supply  to be maintained. Section  6 of the Supply  Regulations  states the conditions  for
cutting off supply, which include, among others, an unpaid bill,  a user putting the safety of the
distributors' installations  at risk, or the reselling of energy.  In all of these cases, the distributor
must first demand regularization  of the anomaly.
Distributive  aspects  of the tariff structure
The law states that tariffs must recognize efficiency costs and the  economic cost, thus
preventing any sort of implicit subsidy in the tariffs.  Each tariff, therefore, for each type of user
and service  provided by the distributor, shall be calculated  on the basis of the exact economic  cost of
the service.  Consequently,  Law 24.065, Section 40, Paragraph b, establishes that the tariffs "shall
take into account the reasonable differences  which exist between the costs of the different types of
services, considering  the supply system, geographical  location and any other characteristic  that the
regulator may consider relevant," while in  the  same section of Decree  1398/92, it states thar
"distribution  costs will be allotted to the different tariff categories bearing in mind: 1) the supply
tension; and 2) the consumption  modality of each user, taking into account the participation in loacl
peaks in the distribution  networks."
The principle of actual economic costs entails, on the one hand, the prohibition of cross-
subsidies in relation to which Section 42, Paragraph e determines that "in no case may the costs
attached  to the service provided to a user or category of users be recovered through tariffs collected
off of other users."  On the other hand, price discrimination is  forbidden by  Section 44:  "No
transmission  company  or distributor may have differences in their tariffs, charges, services or aiTy
other concept, except those resulting from a different location, type of service or any other specific
distinctive feature as the regulator may reasonably approve.  It must be clarified that compliance
with this principle does not hinder the state's capacity to grant subsidies to certain groups.  It only
sets forth the need for these subsidies  to be explicit and not concealed.
Among other remedies, the  law envisages (Decree 1398/92) a  reduction in  tariffs  for
pensioners, charities, non-profit organizations  and/or electricity-intensive  industries.  The cost ~is
charged to the government  area responsible for the subsidized  social sector. Likewise, Section  70 of
the law envisions the creation of a National Electricity Fund, 60% of which will be allocated to
setting up a Subsidiary Fund for Regional Tariff Compensations,  which will be distributed among
the provincial  jurisdictions that adhered to the tariff principles of Law 24.065.  The remaining  40'S
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Although the  above-mentioned sector  of  the  population has  improved  its  living  standard,
shantytowns  in Buenos Aires where the Agreement is not in force have continued to grow.  Some
inhabitants  seem to "flee" from urbanized areas because either they have not paid their bills or they
no longer have a place to live after the streets were opened.
Connection  and reconnection  charges
Concession contracts issued to  the electricity distributors force them to  meet all supply
demands in their area of concession. According to the initial tariff table, connection charges for a.
household  range between $56 and $489, depending  on whether the connection  is common  or special.,
if the area is single-phased  or three-phased, and whether or not it is an underground  connection.
Reconnection  charges for services interrupted  due to lack of payment  (the service is cut off 14 days
after the  due date) are  $4.60 for  households.  However, Section 7  of  the Electricity Supply
Regulations states that in the case of supply suspended  due to lack of payment, the cut-off means
withdrawal  of the connection  and of the meter.  Consequently,  to reinstate the service it is necessary
to pay the costs for a new connection,  in addition  to a rehabilitation  fee.
Special  tariffs for pensioners
Before privatization and the subsequent implementation  of the Argentine electricity sector
reform,  there was a  differentiated tariff  in  place that granted subsidies to  users with  certain
characteristics. In 1988, the Energy Secretariat  set special electricity (and gas) tariffs for pensioners
who used the services  of SEGBA  S.A. or AyEE S.E., with the consideration  that "it is necessary  tD
intensify  the measures  implemented  by the National Government  in relation to improving  the general
situation of pensioners, and an indirect way to achieve this is by  establishing special tariffs for
essential public services."  This benefit, however, does not include all pensioners.  In order to be
eligible, it is necessary for the pensioner to  collect the minimum pension and moreover, be  a
household  user of SEGBA  S.A. or AyEE S.E. electricity  companies. The subsidies  are explicit and
are part of the general state budget.  Their implementation  should not affect the suppliers  economJic
equation. These principles have been respected  by Law (Decree 1738/92)  but the implementation  of
the policy itself has undergone transformations. This pensioner subsidy is applied nation-wide  anLd
is exclusive for network electricity and gas.  It is directly managed by ANSES (National Social
Security Management  Office).  The difference in the billing at the Differential Tariffs and at the
Maximum Tariffs for households was reimbursed by ANSES directly to the companies, pending
prior  verification by  ENRE (Electricity Regulatory Agency) and  ENARGAS (Gas Regulatory
Agency)  of the validity of the reimbursement  requests submitted  by the companies. ANSES had to
compare the list of subsidy beneficiaries  with the list of people on a minimum  pension held by the
social security system.
Decree 1398/92 (which regulates Law 24.065) stated that it was only possible to keep tariff
reductions for pensioners  whose income did not surpass the amount fixed by ENRE for "charities,
duly registered non-profit organizations and/or electricity-intensive  industries if a specific budget
line was set up to pay the licensees the difference  that the subsidy  brought about in their revenue."
Resolution 39/93 of  the  Energy Secretariat sets forth the  extension of  the  special system for
pensioners who are  users of  the distribution companies at the  national level; EDENOR S.A.,
EDESUR  S.A. and EDELAP S.A.  Regarding  the bonus received by the beneficiaries  of the system,
it addresses the bimonthly consumption  of electricity, stating the maximum amounts allowed and
placing a ceiling on the final amount of the subsidy.  The users framed in the tariffs called Tl-Rl
and T1-R2, small household users, are given a 50% discount on the fixed charge and on the first
210 kWh of electricity used in the last two months.  All consumption  above 210 kWh, if any, is
billed at the normal tariff. No discount is applied to users who have bimonthly  consumptions  above
430 kWh.  Likewise, the amount of the subsidy  must be stated in each bill that is forwarded to the17
users. In order  to implement this system,  the distributors had to submit a timely affidavit with the
pertinent information on the beneficiaries to ENRE and ANSES.  In turn,  ENRE requested ANSES
to issue the payment orders  for the distributors regarding billings  accrued for the previous month,
charging it to the pertinent line of the National Budget.
Scattered Rural Population
Users  who live far away from the distribution  network are treated according to the specific
characteristics  of each region.  The  concession contracts  of the  distributors  at  the national  level
envision a special reimbursable contribution to be paid by the users of the non-electrified rural areas.
Some of  the provinces  (e.g.  Jujuy,  Salta and Rio Negro)  have adopted a different  mechanism to
meet  the needs  of  the rural  population  that  lacks  electricity  supply  and  lives  in low  population
density areas that are far away from provincial distribution systems.
In effect, the privatization process considered two different concession areas:
*  the  Concentrated  market,  meaning  the  market  connected  to  the  national  or  provincial
distribution system and the isolated generation systems connected to local networks; and
the Scattered market,  which includes the remaining provincial territories  (with no electricity
supply).
Two  different  companies  were  therefore  set  up  to  provide  services  in  areas  with  specific
attributes,  adjusting  themselves,  of  course,  to  the quality,  environmental  and  tariff  standards  for
each region.  On the other  hand,  due to the fact that this market  has specific characteristics,  the
extension  of  the  distribution  networks  in  order  to  supply  electricity  to  scattered  users  is  not
optimum.  Therefore,  the  inhabitants  of  these  areas  are  supplied  by  using  alternative  systems
(photovoltaic, aeolian, small hydraulic turbines or diesel-run systems). This way, the scattered areas
have their  own tariff tables 20 and the subsidy is paid by the provinces to the licensees.  It is worth
mentioning  the  Electricity  Undersecretariat's  Electricity  Supply  Programme  for  the  scattered
population in Argentina,  through which assistance is provided to some provinces for the elaboration
of similar  mechanisms aiming  at electrifying  1.4 million inhabitants (300,000 households) and  600
public services (schools, health centers and police quarters,  among others).
2.3.  Gas Supply Services
In June 1992, the only state-run gas company that was massively distributing gas by network
at the national level was divided into two big pipeline transmission companies and eight distribution
companies.  The distributor must supply the service to all users who pay enough for said provision
to be profitable for the company.  However, unlike water supply, the users are not forced to connect
to  the network.  Connection charges  range from  $15 to$70  (plus VAT) depending on whether  the
network has ready-to-be-connected household connections for providing  the services or not.  A fine
of $23 is charged for reconnecting a service that was disconnected due to lack of payment, whether
or not the individual meter was removed.
"9The  fact that there are different tariff tables for each licensed area would not  allow for the existence of cross-subsidies among sectors with  different
consumption levels within the concentrated market areas.
20Unlike  conventional tariff tables such as the one for the concentrated market, the user will pay for the energy made available, independent of the level of
consumption.18
Financing  plan for gas installations
Since October 6,  1996, in  accordance with Enargas resolution 412/96, distributors may
finance works through banks.  Under this resolution in May 1997, Gas Natural BAN, the northern
metropolitan  area distributor, launched a financing  plan for the internal installations  for low-incomne
sectors who are reached by the distribution network but have not been able to gain access to the
service (an estimated 150,000  homes within the reach of the distribution  network  have not connected
to the service).According  to the proposed system, the internal installation  could be paid in pesos in
12, 24 or 36 fixed monthly installments, at an annual rate of 14% (prices are fixed at $732, $919
and $1,162, if 2, 3 or 4 devices are connected).  Through this measure, distribution  licensees  plan to
incorporate 500,000 potential users throughout the country who cannot afford internal installation
costs and have no access to any sort of financing. Although these credits will allow low-income
sectors to gain access to gas services, they leave aside the unemployed  because credits will only be
granted against the submission  of a statement  of earnings, Moreover, the regulatory agency allows
the company  to interrupt the services  if the users do not pay the installments  for the connections.
Subsidies  in "low temperature  zones"
When gas distributed by networks was a public service, Gas del  Estado had a regional.
subsidy structure for households, similar to the structures that exist today (entailing substantially
lower costs for those customers  who benefit from the implicit  subsidies). In fact, the tariff sub-areas
used today, for the most part copy the zoning  used by Gas del Estado. Resolution  S.E. Ni  169/92
established, as of January 11, 1993, differential  tariff structures for households  using natural gas in
the provinces  of Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego, provided that they were serviced by the
distributor "Gas del Sur. " Bills were issued every two months.
Currently, there is a subsidy for households  in the Patagonia region.  When subsidizing gas
consumption in particularly cold regions, the externality aimed at is ensuring that basic survival
needs are met in order for the area to have a stable population.  The subsidy is applied through a
differential  tariff table for each sub-area. The colder the region, the higher the subsidy, which then
decreases gradually as consumption  increases (until it is completely  eliminated). This has brought
about reactions from those users who believe their consumption  is not being properly measured, cr
who feel discriminated  against because they are just beyond the established  threshold.  The tariff is
not bloc-increasing  in the traditional sense. If the threshold is surpassed, the whole bill is increased
(a flaw in the design). The subsidy is not applied to any sector other than households.
Universality  and tariff structure
The concession  contract sets forth regulations via the maximnum  prices in constant dollars,
which is seasonally  adjusted twice a year.  Moreover, the agreements include the possibility  of tariff
adjustment  due to technological  advances  (the X-factor) and an adjustment for financing  investment
plans (the K-factor). While the X-factor tends to bring down tariffs, the K-factor tends to increase
them, resulting in a cross-subsidy  by which users that already have the service finance the entry of
new users to the network (it is a subsidy  for all users, not only for the poor).  Since the concession
contract establishes that the licensees cannot generate cross-subsidies  among consumers  unless it is
explicitly set forth in the budget this cross-subsidy is justified by possible positive externalities
(which will be seized by the users that already have the service) stemming from certain network
gains (stabilization  of flow in the pipes).
The principle of universality is not present in the normal user/supplier relationship  for the
servicing of gas through networks, with subsidized consumption  being the only exception to this
rule.  However, this categorization  does not yet allow the assimilation of a certain degree of the
supply  to the "universal  basic service" principle, while only a certain type of consumer  qualifies for19
the subsidies.  The definition  of tariffs  is based  on a  cost  allocation  mechanism grounded  in  the
principle  of  strict variable-fixed  allocation.  Therefore,  the  definition of  distribution  tariffs  is  an
aggregate  of three  concepts:  the  cost of  the gas bought  and  approved by  Enargas,  transportation
costs (affected by the pertinent load factors that distribute  the fixed cost of available transportation
capacity  among  the  cubic  meters  finally  delivered  to  the  client),  and  the  distribution  margin.
However,  this  strict variable-fixed  principle  is not  explicitly  acknowledged  in the  license.  Since
privatization,  household  users  and  those  belonging  to  the  General  Service  category  for  small
consumers  are forced to  pay  a  minimum bill  in  each bimonthly  payment.  This  ensured  revenue
allows distributors to recover the hired transportation capacity costs.
Financing subsidies
Law 24.076 forbids cross-subsidies among consumers (which is understood as the capacity to
recover  costs  incurred  for  supplying  a  certain  category  of  customers  through  tariffs  charged  to
another category or categories).  After privatization, the privatized companies were allowed, through
their  Authorization  Contracts  (which were  issued in  the  form  of  licenses  in  the case  of  the  ten
companies that Gas del Estado was broken down into),  a guarantee that enabled them to collect the
full  amount  of  the  authorized  tariffs  (which  represents  the  ceiling).  In  the  gas  sector,  these
guarantees are backed by the Framework Law, which executed the privatization (Law 24.076).
Since its  implementation,  the  subsidy  settlement  system  has  given  the  regulatory  agency
(Enargas)  the  faculty  to  authorize  the  maximum  applicable  tariffs,  including  differential  tariffs.
However, management of the funds, verification of the settlements and the capacity to propose  the
differential tariff structures to Enargas have undergone changes in ruling and application modalities.
Under the systems that have been in force during the post-privatization era, Gas Distribution
Licensees using networks (regardless of the composition of the fuel flowing through the pipes) have
received funds from those responsible for managing the subsidy (ANSES, in the case of pensioners
collecting a minimum pension,  and the National or Provincial Governments in the case of Patagonia
households).  These  funds  are used  to  compensate  the  licensees  for  the  difference  between  the
maximum authorized tariffs applied to households in each distribution  sub-area, and those effectively
paid by the benefited users.
The  subsidy is  also  applied  through  a  Differential  Tariff  Structure/Table  and  responds  to
provincial geographical boundaries and not to tariff sub-areas.  There are two Differential Tables for
each province,  one for the Winter  (May through  September) and the other for the Summer. Winter
tariffs  are  lower  than  Summer  tariffs,  and  consumption  levels  are  also  wider  in  the  Winter.
Differential  Tariffs are comparatively lower  in the colder  regions  and are applied by consumption
categories adjusted to each region's  conditions (in the cold regions,  the first category that receives a
higher subsidy is the widest).  If the first  category is surpassed,  consumption is again billed  at the
Maximum Tariff  for that two month period.  This  last issue  brought  about severe complaints from
users whose billed amounts jumped despite very slight changes in their level of consumption.
2.4.  Water  and sewage
At  the  time  of  its  privatization,  "Obras  Sanitarias  de  la  Nacion"  (National  Waterworks
Company)  needed  important  refurbishing,  including  the  replacement  of  pipes  and  obsolete
equipment, improvements in the treatment plants,  and expansion of the network,  which at that time
serviced  only  55%  of  the  population  within  its jurisdiction  with  drinking  water  and  39%  with
sewers.  The districts with the lowest per capita income were the most poorly  supplied.
Most of the wastewater (95%)  was not treated before  it was discharged  into the Rio de  la
Plata and there was a great amount of wastewater overflow due to the clogging of sewers.20
The regulations set forth the  investments that needed to  be made, giving the licensees
sufficient freedom to proceed according to each one's outlook, provided that certain coverage and
quality targets were achieved, in particular, the goals outlined in the 30-year concession that is
divided into five-year plans. The licensee  may freely use water resources for obtaining superficial
water (primarily from the Rio de la Plata, which provides 95% of the total amount). The licensee
may also use the underground  layers to spill sewer effluents, which are normally discharged  into the
Rio de la Plata without  any prior treatment. The Regulatory  Framework for the concession,  as stated
in Decree 999/92, explicitly  forbids the licensee  from voluntarily  restraining supply.
Micro-measurement
Micro-measurement  of water consumption  was not widespread. It was applied to only 15%
of  the  connections, and the  recording of  water  consumed was  not  particularly trustworthy.
Moreover, there were a lot of leakages  due to the poor state of the system, and misuse was prevalent
since there was no pricing mechanism.  The reduction of the basic tariff (an element taken intc,
consideration  when awarding  the bids) initially  brought about a 27% decrease in bills. The users in
households  where the service is not measured can decide to shift to this option (optional  pricing).
When there is no meter, a fixed charge is billed; if there is a meter, the fixed charge is 50% less,
but the usage cost is positive and is specified  in the Tariff System.
An ETOSS 1993 resolution set prices for the meters and their cleaning and accessories,  and
also stated that the licensee  hid the option to provide users with a six-month  credit at a rate similar
to the Banco Nacion discount rate.  Since the option may be reverted if the user notes an excessive
increase in the billed amount compared to consumption  prior to the installment  of the meter, the
alternative  of choosing the tariff structure, metered or not, is favorable for the customer since the
licensee  must compensate  the users for an amount  equal to the price of the installed  meter However,
the user must pay a charge that includes the meter, its installation  and accessories  ($150 on average),
as well as an annual charge of $15 for reading the meter. Connection charges for water range
between $153 and  $454 (depending on  the  diameter of  the pipes),  and the  range  for sewer
installations  is between $227 and $255.  Reconnection  charges for the services are between $113.50
and $340 for water and between $192 and $227 for sewers.
The base tariff for service provided without meters is broken down into a fixed charge, the
Basic Bimonthly  Tariff (BBT), total roofed area (RA), a building coefficient (E), which takes into
consideration  the type and age of the premises, plus a tenth of the land surface (LS):
BBT = K*Z*TG*(RA*E  + LS/  10)
where Z is the geographical  area where the premises are located and K is a constant which is equal
to approximately  0.8 (a value of 1 at the time the privatization  took place).  For premises  under the
Empty Plot category, only a tenth of the land's surface will be considered. On the other hand, the
area  factor  Z  fluctuates between 0.8  for  poor  neighborhoods and  3.6  for  the  wealthiest
neighborhoods,  and  just like E, it requires continuous  updating.
The base tariff for measured service is the following:
a)  A fixed charge equal to 50% of the basic bimonthly  tariff (BBT),
b)  A segment  of free consumption  according  to the zone coefficient,  and
c)  A price for every additional  cubic meter
The installation  of meters in households  entails that large low-income  families living in small
or old dwellings  will pay more if shifted to the measured system, unlike high-income  sectors where
smaller families  live in big, modern  houses.21
At  the  time  of  water  meter installation, the  licensee must inspect the  user's  internal
installations and should a  leakage be  detected, the  user must repair  it,  bearing the pertinent
expenses.  The tariff  structure expressly admits the  possibility for the  licensee to  balance its
economic equation through certain groups of users. Before the privatization  process, the economic
cost of providing service was peripheral. To cover costs, including  operation and maintenance  costs
as well as projected  expansion  costs, the Treasury had to aid the company  on several occasions.
Due to the lack of a consumption/tariff  ratio, a rational use was not promoted; the marginal
price was zero for the user,  thus encouraging misuse.  In the tender specifications  for "Obras
Sanitarias de la Nacion," daily consumption  averages are mentioned as "ranging between 280 and
430" liters per inhabitant, which is imprecise. The world average, it should be noted, is 200 liters
per  inhabitant per day.  Since the measured service was not widespread, the company found it
difficult to locate leakages throughout  the distribution  network. As no seasonal variation was taken
into account, and in view of the poor state of the system, water was scarce in Summer, which is
when demand increases. The irnplicit  subsidy  for users with gardens was regressive, ceteris  paribus.
Services consumed  by those users were financed in part by those who did not have gardens. This
was more indicative of  a  regressive subsidy among users  with different income levels than a
progressive  subsidy among  users with different  water consumption  levels.  It did not seem necessary
to use drinking water for irrigation purposes when the area of operations in Obras Sanitarias has
around 1,000 mm of rainfall per annum.
Network  expansion  and infrastructure  charges
In order to  meet community needs, a  chronological schedule of coverage goals must be
established.  In  this manner, those in  political power do  not  delegate their  responsibility for
determining  priorities in meeting the water and sewage needs of the population.  A licensee would
focus on profitability, perhaps at the expense of low-income sectors.  The obligatory nature of
connecting to  the  drinking water and/or sewage networks favors the dissemination of positive
externalities. Regulations  explicitly  mention  the complementary  nature of both services.  In addition
to the obligation of connecting  to the network, the households  must make the internal installations.
The regulations also established the obligation to pay for infrastructure and connection charges,
something  new in the privatization  era.
Providing obligatory  service to all inhabitants  of the serviced areas, or to the regions covered
by the expansion plan, as well as generality, are imposed on the  licensee so as to force it to
effectively  provide the service without the possibility of any sort of discrimination.  The licensee is
also obliged to isolate any other water supply source once the service has been provided, permitting
the user to keep the other source as long as there is no risk to public health or burden on public
services.  Once the service has been provided, the licensee  must also fill in any septic tank or deal
appropriately  with alternative  means of wastewater  disposal. The licensee is obliged  to supply  water,
free of charge, to firemen. Providing water to put out fires is explicitly  mentioned  in the regulations.
Infrastructure  charges may be financed  throughout  two years in equal, consecutive  bimonthly
installments.  However,  the  low-income users  still  find  it  difficult  to  afford  these  prices.
Infrastructure charges are  approxirnately $600 per  customer for  water and  $1000 for  sewers.
Moreover, the licensee charges  between $150 and $200 for connecting  the service to each of the new
users. 2'  The infrastructure charge formula contains a  network component and  a  connection
component:
Cii =  STi KM Pr  +  Pc
2'Recent  studies carried out in the United States have  calculated that, on average, the costs of the basic infrastructure necessary  to meet the needs of a
three member family, providing them with drinking water and sewers, is around US$200, approximately  a fifth of the values fixed for Argentina.22
where Cii is the infrastructure  charge for premises belonging  to a specific  project; STi is the area of
land on which the premises are located; KM is a coefficient  that depends on the type of soil and on
the repairs of pavements and streets in each specific project;  Pr is the price of the distribution
network  component,  and Pc is the connection  component  price.
KM is negatively dependent on the cohesion of the soil and positively dependent on the
underground sheet of water and the percentage of repair required for the pavement and street.
These values appear in a table, and the ratio between extremes  is 2:1.
Since payment of the infrastructure  and connection  charge is obligatory, and in view of the
difficulties of  low-income inhabitants affording such  high  amounts, there  is  currently a  bill
(promoted by  Executive Power  Decree  149/97) that  proposes to  replace  infrastructure and
connection  charges  with a fixed charge in service bills.  According  to the bill, a new charge of $120
would be implemented, payable in 30 monthly installments  of $4 for new users. Part of the $4
would be allocated  for financing sanitation  facilities for wastewater  that is currently spilling  into the
Rio de la Plata.  Should this bill be successful,  it would imply a cross-subsidy  by which all current
users will finance  new entrants to the network.
The  application of  a  fixed  amount that  would substitute the  infrastructure charge  is
questioned  by some sectors of society, who consider that it is neither fair nor equitable  for lower-
income users to face a higher increase in relation to what they pay than customers that consume
more.  The bill would aim to implement  universal service (permitting  the entry of new low-income
users), but in doing so, it would threaten those customers  who currently use the service that wouleL
find it very difficult  to afford a monthly increase  of $4 in fixed charges.
Treatment  of delinquency
The licensee's right to cut off service due to lack of payment  (if at least three terms have not
been paid) is not applicable  to hospitals and clinics, either private or public.  The intervention  of the
Regulatory Agency  may be necessary  to avoid other cut-offs, in accordance  with the regulations  in
force. The adopted system is more severe than others in force (in San Luis, for example, where
water is still provided to  a tap outside the premises). Disconnection charges are equal to  nine
bimonthly  periods of service, with connection  charges representing  three of them.
Since the inhabitants  of the serviced area are forced to enter the network, only the owners of
empty  premises may request  that a property under consideration  is either connected  or disconnected.
The user is not exempted  from obligatory  connection. If users wish to have their own water well or
other alternative  source and not be connected  to the network, they must request  permission  from thie
licensee, who will accept the request as long as the water from the alternative source fulfills the
relevant quality standards.
Besides the obligatory connection to  the network, there is also obligatory installation of
internal household services.  However, as far as water is concerned, there is no regulation that
allows  for bank financing  of the internal installations,  as is the case in the gas sector.
Should the payment of bills be in arrears, the licensee may charge interest and, moreover,
cut off the service when 180  days have elapsed from the due date.  However, the service  may not be
cut off if there is an order from the ETOSS or the Ministry of Health and Social Action.  In this
way, service cuts come under the  sphere of public health, thus preventing cuts in  clinics and
hospitals (either public or private), although the same does not apply to households.  In the latiter
instance,  only the situation  of extremely  poor users is analyzed.
The concession contract authorizes the licensee to bill drinking water in blocs to building
consortiums. This measure facilitates  dealing with delays in the payment of service.  Since a water
cut off would affect all of the users in the building, the neighbors of the delinquent  customers  would23
step  in  to  prevent  this  from  happening. However,  this  measure was  deferred because the
Ombudsman  initiated  proceedings  for the protection  of these rights.
Experience  regarding network expansion
According to a recent MEYSP study (1997), out of the 27 million inhabitants  of the urban
areas, close to 5 million did not have their basic needs met, and most of them had no drinking water
or sewers.  There is no comparative data to show how these figures have evolved, although it is
believed that the situation has improved.  However, the low-income  population may have broken
down into two groups. On the one hand, many low-income people have been included in plans
allowing  them access to services, some of these plans in combination  with the Ministry of Labor (for
example, the inhabitants of a low-income  neighborhood were hired to carry out the infrastructure
works) and the Province of Buenos Aires (more general community coordination and assistance
plans targeted at all aspects of poverty).  In this way, the low-income population improved the
infrastructure  and regularized  their situation  regarding  the ownership of the land they live on. On the
other hand, some residents have been unable to simultaneously  face new obligations  in addition  to
their real estate taxes, payment of their land installments and electricity and water tariffs, among
others.  Therefore, these inhabitants  have shown a trend to migrate toward less formal districts, or
to where these plans are not applicable,  such as the Federal Capital shantytowns.  This has led to the
appearance  of jurisdictional externality and elusive demand, which entails the migration of people
seeking to avoid paying the cost of the service.  Furthennore, the adherence of a great part of the
neighborhood  to the network would make substitutes  disappear, forcing others to move into another
area.
Decree 149/97 authorized the comprehensive  renegotiation  of Aguas Argentinas' goals and
demands  over a term of 180 days, which could be extended for an equal period.  This would be the
first privatization  that is globally reviewed.  The national authorities justified this review of the
concession  by noting the need  to reestablish  the licensee's economic  and financial  equation, which
had been affected  by the suspension  of the infrastructure  and connection  charges  that were to be paid
-by new users.  The impossibility  of paying for infrastructure costs did not change much in Greater
Buenos  Aires, as far as Aguas Argentinas  is concerned.  According  to the budget estimate, in 1997
their revenue would have been around US$50 million, with total bills amounting  to $400 million. In
view of the population's situation, it was impossible  to collect that much money.
It is worth noting that bills that contained  the extra $4 cost per bimonthly  period are already
not performing  to some degree (cf.MEYSP, 1997).  The available figures regarding family income
help to explain why this is happening. For the first decile, the nominal and real income reached a
maximum value in 1994 and then dropped, while the unemployment  rate remained high (affecting
the poorest segments).  In order to compensate  for this imbalance, several alternatives have been
considered  since 1996. These include:
*  modifications  in the economic  and financial  parameters of the concession:  fixed increases  of
$2 or a certain percentage of the tariff, or the reduction (by one-half or one-third) of the
infrastructure  and connection  charges, together with a 7  % tariff increase;
*  extension  of the serviced area to other districts in Greater Buenos  Aires;
*  extension  of the concession  term;
*  temporary  reprogramming  of those works viewed as obligatory  investments;  and
*  Treasury subsidies  for the US$50  million not collected.
It is difficult  to solve  this situation  because  the target population  is the low-income  sector and
the costs for making connections  in poor areas is not really known.  Moreover, the companies  have24
little experience in  solving and dealing with assistance plans because they are  accustomed to
operating in developed  countries.
3. A checklist  of potential  problems  based  on Argentina's  recent experience
From the application  of OS and USO criteria in Argentina, it is possible  to draw some useful
guidelines,  many of which relate to the fact that this specific  privatization  process was quick and far-
reaching.  Although there was some experience in dealing with OS and USO criteria in public
companies, the private operators and regulators encountered  a series of problems that were new to
them.  These problems were exacerbated by the  changing economy and grew along with  the
persistently  high unemployment  rate.
(1)  Anticipate  inter-jurisdictional  externalities
The mobility of  users makes the targeting of  any  service obligation quite difficult. In
Argentina, this issue appeared as a result of the migration  of the inhabitants  of poor neighborhoods
toward  jurisdictions where real estate ownership  was not formalized. They bore the burden of fixed
(and often simultaneous  for all sectors)  expenses  to obtain connections.
(2)  Minimize  the risks imposed  by elusive demand
In Argentina, the analysis of OS emphasized  the minimum expansion  and quality conditions
that were imposed on regulated companies.  After a geographical expansion of the network, the
companies  came across low-income  neighborhoods  which entailed high and uncertain access costs.
This led to more difficulties in achieving  the USO objective  and more hesitation  to progress on OS.
The Agreement on guidelines (Acuerdo Marco) is a good example of a mechanism that seems tco
have worked properly.  It blended the efforts of the companies and the national and provincial
governments,  overlapping  with other social assistance  plans.  The question is whether it would have
worked without these other plans.  This simultaneous  provision of new services may indicate that a
gradual  policy can sometimes  work better than a "shock' procedure.
(3)  Realize  that unemployment  leads to delinquency  and lower expected  tariffs
The demand-side  may self-exclude  themselves due to the tariff, which is related to  their
payment  capacity, the expected  unemployment  rate, their expected salaries and the reconnection  and
delinquency charges.  Within the  framework of  a  static economy without unemployment, the
optimum tariff structure depends on the elasticity of the fixed and usage charges.  In an economy
with persistent unemployment  and an improper income distribution, these elasticities  are even more
important.
(4)  Deal with the fact that the poor have less access  to credit
Most of the financial assistance programs in Argentina did not take the unemployed into
account, yet this is the group that usually has no access to credit. The expected tariff for the
unemployed  poor may be much higher than the normal tariff: these people know that they will go
through periods in which they will not be able to afford the tariff, and that they will have to pay
reconnection and delinquency charges, in  addition to  those for  infrastructure.  Moreover, the
expansion of services was implemented  side-by-side  with the elimination of leakages, misuse and
clandestine  connections. In other words, there was a decrease in the availability  of the services  that
were free of charge.  It is true that normal tariffs, in general, are relatively lower than the cost of
any substitute.  But many times, these substitutes can be bought on the spot, when needed, while
access to  the network and a  fixed charge entail an  implicit contract and  a  certain degree of
commitment and  inflexibility. Ultimately, the  plans that  included credit  for  the  payment of
infrastructure  charges  were not that successful.
(5)  Coordinate  regulatory  policy, employment  policy and social policy25
The  regulatory policy  was  implemented faster  and  with  clearer  objectives than  the
unemployment  policy, which may account for some of the difficulties encountered. To try to solve
unemployment  problems through the tariff structure is not an optimum solution, and to define a
cross-subsidy  structure is not sustainable  in the long run.  In some sectors, the cross-subsidy  policy
is explicit (such as in water), in others it is implicit.  It includes both use (on-going)  as well as
expansion (one-off).  The  issue  here  is  whether to  operate under  the  assumption that  full
employment  exists, or to allow for a provision regarding the informality and low income of the
targeted users  and  permit  cross-subsidies, or  to  address  poverty  at  a  different  and  more
comprehensive  level.  Nevertheless,  some of the more successful  plans to ensure Universal Service
were those that improved both things at the  same time, in particular, using workers from poor
families  for infrastructure  extension  works.
(6)  Beware of latent opportunism  of users who benefit from special programs
The special tariffs in telephony which favor the pensioners collecting a minimum pension
show that  special treatment of  a  sector may induce free-riding.  When these pensioners had
unlimited special subsidies, their bills were higher compared  to average households, and even when
compared to  some commercial users.  In  the  telephony sector, this problem was corrected by
establishing  a maximum  number of calls.
(7)  Fixed allocations  for payment  of services  do not ensure  USO
In the cases of gas, electricity and water, the system shifted from a scheme subsidizing  the
pensioners  using social security funds to a fixed monthly allocation  included in their pensions  for all
service bills.  The objective was to avoid burdening the pensioner with excessive bills for public
services, but it has already been noted that many pensioners  do not pay their bills.  If the services
are cut off, the desired  externalities  will have not been achieved. If they are paid from public funds,
the above objective  will not be fulfilled. Therefore, a solution  has yet to be found.
(8)  Anticipate  the fact that operators  have greater  information  than the regulator.
There is little knowledge  of the cost of reaching agents located in regions far away from the
densely populated areas.  This may open the door to  some sort of  "moral hazard issue" with
companies who  exaggerate supply costs  in  these  districts.  If  there  are  available alternative
technologies,  their use, in competition  with currently used technologies, limits the above effect.  An
example is satellite technologies  for rural areas. In addition, imposing  a consultation  process with
the beneficiaries  often provides useful sources of information  to increase the accountability  of the
operators. Direct interaction with the poor users  often leads the  selection of much more cost
effective technologies in electricity (with shared connections for poor  neighborhoods with joint
responsibilities  to pay the bills) and in water where cheaper pipes can be used because they are
maintained  more frequently  and locally  at low costs
(9)  Often "tailored"  programs  are much more effective  than standardized  programs
There is a wide perception ex-ante by politicians and policymakers  that the social concerns
to be addressed and the social goals to  achieved are of a general nature and that setting fixed,
homogenous  rules among agents is good enough.  However, the diversity of situations is quite
impressive. For instance, there is a wide variety of agents, located in more costly areas, with or
without a job, pensioned  or not, and among the latter, those who have additional income and those
who do not.  The "tailored" programs are clearly more expensive, but they are often more feasible
solutions and achieve much faster political support as well as local support from the users, and a
large chunk of these social programs are probably  more effective  when they are demand driven!.26
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